According to the classical Indian school of logic (Nyāya), which fallacy is committed in the following argument: “Anything that is thinkable is nameable because it is thinkable”?

Correct option is A

In the Nyāya school of logic, the fallacy of Asādhāraṇa occurs when the middle term (hetu) is too narrow or restricted, making it incapable of applying to either the subject or the predicate universally.
In the argument “Anything that is thinkable is nameable because it is thinkable,” the hetu (reason) “thinkable” does not properly establish the relationship between the subject and predicate.
The term thinkable is overly specific, failing to serve as a proper middle term in the syllogism.
Information Booster:
Nyāya Fallacies (Hetvabhasa):
Asādhāraṇa: Middle term is too specific or narrow.
Sādhāraṇa: Middle term is too general or irrelevant.
Āśrayāsiddha: Subject is non-existent or unestablished.
Svarūpāsiddha: Middle term is invalid in its own nature.
Key Logical Terms:
Paksha (Subject): The entity being discussed.
Sādhya (Predicate): The property being attributed to the subject.
Hetu (Reason): The justification provided for the relationship.
Additional Knowledge:
Sādhāraṇa (b):
Example: "A mountain has fire because it has color." The middle term “color” is too general and applies to irrelevant cases.
Āśrayāsiddha (c):
Example: "The horns of a rabbit are sharp because they are horns." The subject “horns of a rabbit” is non-existent.
Svarūpāsiddha (d):
Example: "Sound is eternal because it is created." The middle term "created" contradicts the nature of eternality.